

● ROUTINE

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DIST 28 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

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SUBJECT VIEWS: [REDACTED] CONCERNING FIDEL CASTRO AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA; AND CUBAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET THEORIES OF REVOLUTION.

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SOURCE

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TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

TO FBI: FOR MR. S. J. PAPICH

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SUMMARY:

CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT RIPE FOR ARMED

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REVOLUTION ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN LATIN AMERICA IS SELF-DEFEATING BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VARYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH COUNTRY, IT SEEKS TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER INDIGENOUS REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, AND REFLECTS THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY FAULTY PLANNING AND POOR EXECUTION AND HAVE BEEN DAMAGING TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA HAS SHIFTED FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE. IT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND HOPES IN A FEW YEARS TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IT REJECTS THE CUBAN SUPPORTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY OF THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER, DOUGLAS BRAVO. WHILE THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION BOTH CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE, THE SOVIET THEORY IS MORE FLEXIBLE. THE SOVIET LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS CANNOT TRY TO ELIMINATE CASTRO, HOWEVER, FOR WITHOUT HIM THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THE UNITED STATES COULD BE TOLERATING CASTRO BECAUSE HE AIDS IMPERIALISM BY DESTROYING LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

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FIDEL CASTRO, CUBA, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMED REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. ARMED REVOLUTION IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA BECAUSE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST. FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE HAVE PROVED THIS CONCLUSIVELY. CONTINUED ATTEMPTS AT ARMED REVOLUTION WOULD RESULT IN THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND LEADERS. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF PERMANENTLY ABANDONING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, ONLY OF ADJUSTING TO CURRENT REALITIES. IF SOME DAY ARMED REVOLUTION BECOMES AN APPROPRIATE FORM OF STRUGGLE, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) WILL RESORT TO IT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE PARTY IS WORKING DILIGENTLY ON CREATING A NEW ARMED ENTITY CAPABLE OF MOUNTING AN INSURRECTION. THIS PARAMILITARY ARM WILL OPERATE MAINLY IN THE CARACAS AREA. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE MADE THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENT AND HAVE SHIFTED THE STRUGGLE TO THE POLITICAL ARENA. IN GUATEMALA THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ARE BETTER THAN ELSEWHERE, BUT STILL ARE NOT GOOD. CHILE IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE A COMMUNIST REGIME COULD COME TO POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS.

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5 2. FIDEL CASTRO'S POLICY OF EXPORTING VIOLENT REVOLUTION TO
4 THE LATIN AMERICA IS BASED ON FANTASY, NOT REALITY. THIS IS PARTLY
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BECAUSE CASTRO GETS ERRONEOUS INFORMATION FROM LATIN AMERICANS WHO HAVE PERSONAL AND SPECIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS TO ADVANCE. THE UNAVOIDABLE RESULT HAS BEEN A SERIES OF REVERSES AND DISASTERS. CASTRO HAS THUS BECOME A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO ALL LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. THE OVERRIDING PROBLEMS THAT CASTRO POSES FOR LATIN AMERICA ARE PROBLEMS OF "CONTROL" AND "INTERVENTION" BY HIS INSISTENCE ON CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS HE SUPPORTS. CASTRO SEES THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS A CONTINENTAL REVOLUTION BUT ACTUALLY THE FACTORS AND FORCES IN THE FUNDAMENTAL SITUATION ALL HAVE NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE DIFFERENT IN EACH COUNTRY. THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN EACH COUNTRY MUST CONTROL THEIR MOVEMENTS AND ARE BEST ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS.

3. AGGRAVATING THE PROBLEM IS THE FACT THAT CASTRO IS FACING A SERIOUS INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS STEMMING FROM HIS ONE-MAN RULE. SINCE CASTRO MAKES ALL THE DECISIONS, MANY OF THEM ARE INEVITABLY WRONG AND THE WHEELS OF GOVERNMENT MOVE SLOWLY. ANOTHER RESULT OF HIS PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP IS THE FAILURE TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE REGIME.

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IN SPITE OF CASTRO'S DOMESTIC FAILURES, HE STILL HAS POPULAR SUPPORT IN CUBA BUT HOW LONG HE CAN CONTINUE WITH UNFULFILLED YEARLY PROMISES OF BREAD IS VERY UNCERTAIN. SHOULD HE BE SUCCEEDED BY HIS BROTHER RAUL, THE ENSUING RULE BY VIOLENCE AND TERROR WOULD NOT LAST LONG, FOR WITHOUT FIDEL THE REGIME WOULD FALL.

4. AS AN HISTORICAL FIGURE CASTRO IS IMPORTANT TO ALL LATIN AMERICA, AND SO IS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, BUT ONLY AS AN INSPIRATION, NOT AS A MODEL. LATIN AMERICA MUST BE GRATEFUL FOR CASTRO'S SHOWING THAT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION IS POSSIBLE JUST NINETY MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES, EVEN IF HIS REVOLUTION WAS NOT A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION. CASTRO WAS NOT A COMMUNIST THEN. IN FACT, HIS REVOLUTION FOUGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. TODAY, WHO KNOWS WHAT CASTRO IS? PERHAPS HE IS AN "IRREGULAR COMMUNIST."

5. THE FAULTINESS OF CUBAN PLANNING IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE AND THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA, FOR WHICH BOTH CASTRO AND GUEVARA ARE RESPONSIBLE. WHILE GUEVARA'S DEATH WAS A GREAT DISASTER AND A WORLD TRAGEDY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW GUEVARA COULD

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COMMIT SUCH A BLUNDER AS TO GO TO BOLIVIA AND PERSONALLY LEAD THE ARMED STRUGGLE. HE WAS ACTUALLY A FOREIGNER IN BOLIVIA AND NEEDED AN INTERPRETER TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE. ONE CUBAN INSTRUMENT TO CONTROL REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA IS THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LASO IS A NEGATIVE FACTOR AND AN ELEMENT OF DIVISION; IT WILL NOT LAST LONG.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA AND DOUGLAS BRAVO, LEADER OF THE DISSIDENT ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) SEEKS TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES AND ADVANCE ITS INTERESTS BY POLITICAL MEANS THROUGH A LEFTIST FRONT AND WITHOUT TERRORISTS. IN SHIFTING TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE THE PCV LEADERSHIP IS UNQUESTIONABLY RIGHT. ALL PLANS OF THE PCV ARE BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IS STABLE AND SUCCESSFULLY REFORMIST IN NATURE. THIS IMPORTANT "TRANSFORMATION" HAS CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO CHANNEL DISCONTENT ALONG THE LINES OF ARMED STRUGGLE. THE PCV PREFERS SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND JUDGES THAT WITHIN A FEW YEARS THERE IS THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PARTY MAY BE ABLE TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE PARTY WILL

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CERTAINLY PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND WILL HAVE CANDIDATES. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO PERMIT THIS SINCE IT WILL BE CONVENIENT FOR IT TO DO SO. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PCV IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE MAIN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN VENEZUELA ARE THE PCV, THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF NATIONALIST INTEGRATION (PRIN), THE PRIETO WING OF THE RULING DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (AD), AND THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE (FDP).

7. DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS DISSIDENT COMMUNIST FALN DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING FORCE. BRAVO REPRESENTS STRICTLY A CUBAN EFFORT AND IF CASTRO WITHDRAWS HIS SUPPORT, BRAVO'S EFFORTS WOULD COLLAPSE IN "TWO MINUTES." [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN MAY 1967 BRAVO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FUNDS FROM CHINA THAT WERE BEING HELD UP BY THE CUBANS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] WHILE BRAVO IS BRAVE AND DARING, HIS IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL IS LOW. A MEASURE OF HIS STUPIDITY IS THAT HE STILL VIEWS THE REVOLUTION AS A MILITARY PROBLEM. IN ACTUAL FACT, BRAVO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE ONLY ISOLATED TERRORIST ACTS. ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZES

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OPERATIONS IN RURAL AREAS, FOR EVERY TERRORIST ACT HE CARRIES OUT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE ARE NINETEEN IN THE CITY. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCORD BETWEEN THE PCV AND DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS GUERRILLA FORCES.

8. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CUBAN PROBLEMS, CASTRO IS DESPERATE FOR A FOREIGN VICTORY AND IS PRESSURING BRAVO TO GO INTO ACTION AND ACHIEVE SOME VICTORIES. BRAVO, HOWEVER, IS UNABLE TO DELIVER THE VICTORIES THAT CASTRO WANTS AND NEEDS. TENSION IS MOUNTING BETWEEN BRAVO AND HAVANA BECAUSE BRAVO IS NOT SO STRONG AS HE HAS LED CASTRO TO BELIEVE AND, IN FACT, IS GETTING WEAKER. [REDACTED] COMMENT:

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[REDACTED] FRICTION EXISTED BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND THE VENEZUELAN IN BRAVO'S FORCES AND [REDACTED] THE CUBANS INTENDED TO INFORM FIDEL CASTRO THAT BRAVO HAD GROSSLY EXAGGERATED THE SIZE OF HIS FORCES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS FEATS.

CUBAN, CHINESE AND SOVIET THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

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9. THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION ARE SIMILAR, BOTH CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, CALL FOR A LONG WAR BY THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEASANTS. THE CHINESE HAVE NO

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INFLUENCE OR IMPORTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA. THE CUBAN THEORY CALLS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE BY SMALL GROUPS OF GUERRILLAS USING SMALL ARMS, NOT HEAVY WEAPONS. JULES REGIS DEBRAY IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE. WHILE DEBRAY IS NO DOUBT THE AUTHOR OF REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION, HIS BOOK IS BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE, TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, AND IRRELEVANT TO LATIN AMERICA. INTEREST IN THE BOOK WILL DIMINISH TO JUST NOTHING.

10. THE SOVIET THEORY OF REVOLUTION CALLS FOR ALL FORMS AND METHODS OF STRUGGLE. THERE IS NO SINGLE FORM THAT CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. TO FAVOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE ALONE IS PURE DOGMATISM. THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE A SINGLE LINE OR POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA. THEIR LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF A SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS ARE PROVIDING NEITHER FINANCIAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PCV AND ARE NOT DICTATING WHAT THE PCV POLICY SHOULD BE. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PCV AND MOSCOW ARE "FRATERNAL EXCHANGES."

COMMENT:

THE PCV RECEIVES A SUBSIDY FROM ABROAD. IT IS BELIEVED THIS SUBSIDY COMES FROM THE USSR.)

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12. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT HAS, OF COURSE, ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. IN LATIN AMERICA, HOWEVER IT HAS ALSO HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT. IT HAS ENCOURAGED THE COMMUNIST LEADERS TO SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTION AND HAS PROMOTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE. PRECISELY ONE OF THE BAD EFFECTS OF CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TO "PUT LEADERS TO SLEEP" BY ATTEMPTING TO DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT TENDS TO COUNTER THAT.

13. CASTRO POSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT IT TOO IS DANGEROUS FOR THEM TO TRY TO ELIMINATE HIM. WITHOUT CASTRO, THE REGIME WOULD SOON FALL, AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO THE VIEW THAT CASTRO IS AN UNWITTING COLLABORATOR OF IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA FOR CASTRO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS DISASTERS OF SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA AND THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE. IT COULD WELL BE THAT THE UNITED STATES TOLERATES CASTRO BECAUSE CASTRO AIDS "IMPERIALISM" BY DESTROYING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, THUS DOING GREAT DAMAGE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO COMMUNIST PARTIES. SECURITY LEAKS IN CUBA COULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH DISASTERS AS THE GUERRILLA LANDING/ MACHURUCUTO ON

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THE COAST OF VENEZUELA, THE ARREST OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
COURIER BELTRAMINI, AND THE BOLIVIAN FAILURE. [REDACTED]

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14. [REDACTED] DISSEM: [REDACTED] SOUTHCOM ONLY, CINCLANT ONLY:

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